TURMOIL IN GAZA

Tensions rose dangerously in Gaza following the mass arrests of Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists by the Palestinian National authority (PNA) in early November. Even though many local observers had predicted the eruption of violence among Palestinians all were shocked by the events of Friday, November 18, when up to 14 Palestinian were killed and some 200 wounded in a day-long battle with the Palestinian police around Gaza City.

A historic chance for a viable Palestinian future seemed on the verge of being thrown away. What had gone wrong? What will be the shape of life in the aftermath of this latest massacre? And how can Palestinians recover from the depths of their grief to salvage their future?

The environment in Gaza has been dominated in the last few weeks by a polarization between opposing political stances, as more people become disillusioned with the “peace process.” The chronic stress of life under a brutal Israeli occupation has conditioned the popular mood to swing sharply between euphoria and depression in reaction to events. Palestinians’ expectations of economic recovery and prosperity have been thwarted by repeated border closures under autonomy. Poverty has hit hard, as unemployment rose above 50 percent.

Meanwhile, the initial feeling of freedom and security has evaporated, as tales of corruption and intimidation have spread. Many have concluded that the restrictions imposed by the Cairo accord are deeply humiliating. People observed that the agreement with Israel has turned Palestinian leaders into virtual captives in Gaza and Jericho, who could not even travel from one autonomy zone to the other. As the months went by they became increasingly angered by Israel’s refusal to free Palestinian political prisoners.

The conduct of Yasser Arafat has not helped. He shed the hero’s halo as he helplessly endured Yitzhak Tabin’s insults. Damning too have been Arafat’s outbursts of temper, the nepotism that marked his appointments, his refusal to delegate even minor matters, his autocratic style and his controversial links with local villains against the advice of his own ministers. He in effect reduced his cabinet to mere ceremonial status by insisting that he remain the sole reference and arbiter of all Palestinian affairs.

Arafat and the PNA became the butt of local jokes. People did not appreciate his ostentatious motor parades, nor his ubiquitous security men driven in or driving stolen cars. Civil servants complained of a breakdown in the decision-making process, as the were forced to refer more and more of their business to Arafat himself, particularly in the realms of personnel matters and taxation. Gradually people were losing faith and hope.

During the last six months of Palestinian rule Hamas has gained sympathy and support. Hamas and Islamic Jihad are part of the phenomenon sweeping the region following the defeat of Arab nationalism. Islamic militants are strengthened by the colonial nature of the Israeli settlement movement, spearheaded by Jewish fundamentalists, and by economic collapse. As the peace process has looked increasingly unproductive, Hamas has championed ongoing resistance to the Israelis and opposition to the PLO-Israeli agreement, now viewed as a virtual sell-out.

The bus massacre of 23 Israelis in Tel Aviv in late October speeded up the process of inevitable confrontation. From the early days ambivalent messages were thrown about by both the sages were thrown about by both the PNA and Hamas. The PNA, feeling increasingly insecure, could not without ample cause take the decision of confrontation since it feared the consequences.

The bus bombing gave it the needed pretext. By arresting Hamas activists, the PNA wanted to demonstrate that it had both the power and the will to impose its authority. It sent hundreds of police and security officers to the streets of Gaza as a show of force. But such was the insecurity of the PNA that it also banned political meetings and demonstrations. This act described as necessary for security purposes, spectacularly overlooked the psychological needs of an oppressed community for free expression. Suddenly, the image of the Palestinian policeman metamorphosed from protector to oppressor.

These events were happening while the PNA was showing a voracious appetite for funds through taxation. The recruitment into the police of some ex-detainees did not help matters. Some of these men had been tortured and suffered at the hands of Israelis severe forms of psychological damage, including the effect of identification with the aggressor. Once they were enjoying power they were not able to handle their suppressed anger, which, ironically, came out against the wrong target.

There is no doubt in my mind that the PNA had taken a decision to teach the Islamic movement a lesson. The timing was interesting, as it closely followed the humiliation of Yasser Arafat at the funeral of an Islamic Jihad martyr. In early November Arafat was jeered and forced to leave the Omari Mosque in Gaza City by a crowd of Islamic Jihad supporters mourning for Hani Abed, who had been killed in the Gaza Strip by a car bomb that bore all the marks of an Israeli operation.

On the morning of Friday, November 18, the police force was in place around the mosque, armed with shields and ammunition. The Islamic activists were also ready for a showdown, armed with posters, slogans and loud speakers. Some may have been armed. The confrontation was inevitable, but we were all stunned at the scale of the killing. People wondered if the Israelis would have killed so many in one day.

Both parties are accusing each other of premeditation and even collaboration with outside forces—meaning Isrtael, although some also blame Jordan. Some suspect that there may be an Israeli Plan to hand parts of the West Bank back to Jordan, once it has been demonstrated that the PNA is not up to the job of self-rule. The PNA has claimed in an official communique that hamas was armed by a foreign power in order to destroy the Palestinian entity and the hope of building a state. Hamas declared that the PNA is a humble servant of Zionism

Today we have at hand the ingredients for a full-fledged civil war: acute polarization, deep resentments, high tension, an insecure PNA, bold opponents, general frustration and despair. Above all, both sides lack discipline and both have plenty of arms. Neither side is ads yet ready to include the other although the PNA has attempted containment. The conclusion is frightening and the future looks bleak.

People today feel alienated form the whole political system and more of them accuse both parties of playing havoc with their lives. Afarat’s leadership is severely undermined. If anything Hamas has gained more ground.

There is an urgent need today for a national conference to debate the peace process and the conduct of the PNA, and to form a body to enforce and election on all parties concerned. Palestinians need a credible leadership with which they can identify. They need to feel like dignified citizens able to participate in the shaping of their future. Only a democratically elected leadership can rule by law and enforce it with the power of the people. If Arafat is elected, he will then be mandated by the people with a power that is far more reassuring than that of his security apparatus. Israel should not object to the election and if it does, Palestinians should go ahead anyway.